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CAMPAIGN REFORM IN NEW MEXICO
AND FIRST AMENDMENT LIMITS

During the whole time of the polling, the town was in a perpetual
fever of excitement. Everything was conducted on the most liberal
and delightful scale. Exciseable articles were remarkably cheap at all
the public-houses; and spring vans paraded the streets for the accommodation of voters who were seized with any temporary dizziness in
the head-an epidemic which prevailed among the electors, during
the contest, to a most alarming extent, and under the influence of
which they might frequently be seen lying on the pavements in a
state of utter insensibility.
-C. Dickens, Pickwick Papers

Campaign abuses may be more subtle now than in Dickens' time,
but the Watergate scandal and attendant revelations made it clear
that they remain prevalent. Enormous campaign costs lead candidates to depend on large contributions. Contributors play on that
dependence by expecting favors in return for their donations. The
goal of financial disclosure laws is to allow the public to know who is
supporting a particular candidate so that voters may take a candidate's financial backers into consideration when voting. If certain
groups reap substantial benefits from an officeholder's actions, the
public should be informed as to the extent those groups contributed
to the candidate's campaign.
Statutory limitations on contributions are intended to lessen the
investigative burden upon voters by prohibiting contributions large
enough to give a donor excessive influence upon a candidate. Limitations on total expenditures would reduce a candidate's need for large
contributions. Finally, government financing of campaigns would
obviate entirely a candidate's need to rely on private contributions.
In the 1974 and 1975 sessions of the New Mexico Legislature
several bills to reform state campaign finance laws were introduced.
All were defeated. The legislature may have another chance in the
1976 session to pass a campaign reform bill. An interim Election
Code Review Committee' has been appointed to draft a bill to be
1. Consisting of: Representative Appelman, Representative Berry, Senator Chavez,
Senator G. Hansen, Representative Lucero, Representative Luna, Senator Rutherford.
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introduced by way of the Governor's message. 2 Whether the Committee will complete its task, or whether the Governor will introduce
such a bill remains uncertain. 3
New Mexico is very much in need of new laws controlling campaign finance. Although the state has had some form of controls
since its admission to statehood, 4 the present statute' requires little
of candidates and contains innumerable loopholes. This Comment
will briefly examine the New Mexico law and its defects. It will
discuss possible provisions of a campaign reform bill in the light of
constitutional objections to their validity.
PRESENT NEW MEXICO LAW
The New Mexico statute requires reporting of contributions and
expenditures but places no limitations on either.6 Reports must be
made after the election to either the Secretary of State or the county
clerk.7 The name of a successful candidate who fails to report after a
primary election will not be printed on the ballot 8 ; a successful
candidate who fails to report after a general election will not be
allowed to assume office. 9 And a candidate or committee treasurer

who fails to report is guilty of a petty misdemeanor.' 0
New Mexico law fails to attain the goal of full disclosure in a
number of ways. A few of the more glaring loopholes follow.
1. Candidates themselves are required to report only their expenditures,' 1 but are not required to report receipts. Such a provision
will bring to light corrupt practices only if the candidate is honest
enough to report expenditures of $1,000 to buy the votes of 40
derelicts or of $500 to an election official to stuff the ballot box.
Reporting of expenditures is effective only if receipts are also reported so that the two amounts can be crosschecked for slush funds
or other suspicious circumstances. Furthermore, reports of contribu2. Interview with Ruby Appelman, New Mexico State Representative, in Albuquerque,
New Mexico, June 29, 1975.
3. Interview with Joan Ellis, Legislative Council Service, in Santa Fe, New Mexico, Sept.
2, 1975. The Committee held hearings on campaign reform in late August.
4. N.M. Laws 1912, ch. 63.
5. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 3-19-1 et seq. (Repl. 1970).
6. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 3-19-2, 3-19-4, 3-19-9, 3-19-11, 3-19-18 (Repl. 1970).
7. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 3-19-5; 3-19-12, 3-19-21 (Repl. 1970). Reports by candidates
must be filed within ten days after the election. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 3-19-2, 3-19-9 (Repl.
1970). Reports by political committees must be made within thirty days after the election.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 3-19-18 (Repl. 1970).
8. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 3-19-7A (Supp. 1973).
9. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 3-19-13 (Supp. 1973).
10. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 3-19-7 and 3-19-13 (Supp. 1973).
11. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 3-19-2, 3-19-9 (Repl. 1970).
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tions are important by themselves to identify for the public a candidate's supporters.
2. New Mexico does require political committees to report all
receipts,"2 but contributions need not be made to a committee.
Anyone can give money to the candidate, who can then pass it on to
the committee, which will report a receipt from the candidate.
3. There is no limit to the number of campaign committees a
candidate may set up. Although establishing a myriad of committees
to support a single candidate does not necessarily defeat the goal of
full disclosure, it makes voter investigation a much more bewildering
task. Interested voters must add up all the figures and check between
the various committees to find contribution totals. Most campaign
reform legislation limits the number of committees.' 3 This is more
convenient not only for voters and for any enforcement agency, but
also for candidates.
4. The statute defines a "political committee" as one organized
for the election or defeat of a candidate.1 Thus the statute might be
construed as excluding a committee organized in a campaign for a
primary election from the definition and exempting it from the
reporting requirement.' s

5. The statute does not set a date on which the reporting period
for candidates is to begin."6 Yet some candidates campaign for
months or years before an election. If the reporting requirement
begins when candidacy is formally announced, the campaign could
have spent thousands of dollars before the candidate is required to
begin reporting. Some definition of the word "candidate" is needed

so that a person can have a clear indication of when that status is
attained and when reporting requirements begin. 1 7

12. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 3-19-18 (Repl. 1970).
13. Massachusetts limits a candidate to two committees. Barnhill, MassachusettsPolitical
Finance Laws-An Overview, 59 Mass. L.Q. 235, 245 (1974). One "model" reporting law
requires a candidate to designate one treasurer and one depository through which all campaign funds must pass. Rodgers, A Model Bill on the Reporting of Campaign Contributions
and Expenditures, 23 Vand. L. Rev. 293, 306 (1970).
14. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 3-19-14 (Repl. 1970).
15. An attempt was made in the last session of the New Mexico Legislature to remedy
the defect by defining a "political committee" as one organized for the nomination, election
or defeat of a candidate. S. B. 398 (N.M.), 32nd Leg., Ist Sess. § 8 (1975).
16. Political committees must report receipts and expenditures for a period beginning
ninety days before the election and ending on the day the report is filed. N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 3-19-18 (Repl. 1970).
17. Massachusetts has one subjective test and three objective tests for determining who is
a candidate. First, a candidate is anyone who intends to run for office. Second, a candidate
is anyone who a) receives a contribution or makes an expenditure for the purpose of
influencing his or her nomination or election for office, b) takes action necessary to qualify
for nomination of election, or c) if an office holder, receives money or makes expenditures
resulting from a fundraising activity. Barnhill, supra, note 13, at 236-7.
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6. Since reports need not be filed until after the election, they are
of no help to voters who want to compare candidates' financial
supporters before deciding for whom to vote. Although general election voters may refer to financial statements from the primary when
deciding how to vote, a candidate's primary election contributors
may be very different from his or her general election contributors.
And no such guidance is offered to voters during the primary campaign.
7. Reports are to be made to partisan elected officials rather than
to an independent body.1 8 A hungry watchdog appointed to guard a
steak may keep everyone else away, but he may eat it himself. Even
the most honest Secretary of State or county clerk may find it hard
to be objective towards members of his or her own party and an
unscrupulous official could render the law meaningless.
8. The enforcement provisions of the statute are inadequate.
Election officials are not charged with bringing violations to the
attention of the Attorney General or district attorney. There are no
means of crosschecking figures through bank statements of a central
depository. And the penalties-mainly petty misdemeanors-are very
light for so serious an offense as attempting to subvert the election
process. Winning candidates are subject to the penalty of losing their
place on the ballot or their certificates of election, but as long as
there is so little supervision over the veracity of reports, winning
candidates need not fear punishment for what they turn in, as long as
they turn in something.
In Bernalillo County, at least, little effort has been made by the
County Clerk's office to verify the content of financial statements.
The reports are filed as they come in, and no further attention is paid
to them. A list of candidates who have failed to file is printed in the
newspapers, but this sanction holds so little terror for candidates that
many never turn in reports.1 9
POSSIBLE PROVISIONS OF A CAMPAIGN REFORM BILL
Two problems face drafters of a campaign reform bill. First,
provisions must be chosen which will most effectively fulfill the goals
of campaign reform. Second, although it is for the courts rather than
the legislature to reject a bill because it is unconstitutional, careful
drafting should minimize serious constitutional problems inherent in
such statutes.
18. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 3-19-5, 3-19-12, 3-19-21 (Repl. 1970).
19. Interview with Tenny Culp, Deputy Clerk for Bernalillo County, in Albuquerque,
New Mexico, June 30, 1975. Ms. Culp noted that the financial statements for the last
election were filed before the present County Clerk took office.
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Any regulation of political activity is suspect under the First
Amendment. 20 The guarantee of free speech was intended primarily
to protect political acticity, to ensure a free flow of ideas throughout
society and to invite the widest possible range of philosophical contribution to government. 2 ' Although campaign reform laws impose
limitations on some political activity, they are also designed to give
access to government to a greater number of people by reducing or
eliminating special influence by the wealthy. A law's effectiveness in
achieving that goal should count in its favor when it is challenged on
First Amendment grounds. One court recently said of the federal
campaign law, "There is a positive offset to ... invocation of the
First Amendment in ... that the statute taken as a whole affirmatively enhances First Amendment values." '2 2
Professor Emerson has proposed some guidelines for determining
the constitutionality of regulation of political expression:
[T] he burden of proof is on the proponents of the regulation to
establish (a) that the control is clearly necessary to correct a grave
abuse in the operation of the system and is narrowly limited to that
end, and that this objective cannot be achieved by other means; (b)
that the regulation does not limit the content of expression; (c) that
the regulation operates equitably and with no undue advantage to
any group or point of view; (d) that the control is in the nature of a
regulation, not a prohibition, and does not substantially impair the
area of expression controlled; and (e) that the regulation can be
specifically formulated in objective terms and is reasonably free of
the possibility of administrative abuse.2 3
But few effective statutes fit Professor Emerson's mold. Three courts
have come to differing conclusions on the constitutionality of various
provisions of campaign reform laws. Their analysis resembled Professor Emerson's "ad hoc balancing test"' 2 4 in that they based their
holdings on the necessity of campaign regulation to satisfy a compelling state interest and on the possibility of less restrictive alternatives. Both the Washington and Oregon Supreme Courts found the
statutory limitations on campaign expenditures in their states
unconstitutional. 2 ' The United States Court of Appeals for the
20. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1971); Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383
U.S. 663 (1966).
21. This theory is eloquently expressed in J. S. Mill, On Liberty (1849). and more
recently in A. Meiklejohn, Political Freedom (1948).
22. Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 841 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
23. T. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 634 (1970).
24. Id. at 717.
25. Bare v. Gorton, 84 Wash.2d 380, 526 P.2d 379 (1974); Deras v. Myers,
Ore.
535 P.2d 541 (1975).
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2
District of Columbia in Buckley v. Valeo 6 held that all the major
provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 19712" (FECA)
and the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 197428
(FECAA) were constitutional. 2 9

Reporting of Contributionsand Expenditures
Campaign disclosure laws are the most common and the least controversial constitutionally of the reform measures. As of August
30
1974 all but four states had enacted some form of disclosure law.
Disclosure requirements for federal elections, included in FECA,
prompted Maurice Stans's hurried trip in late 1971 to collect3 contributions for Richard Nixon before the law went into effect. Without the reporting requirement of FECA the notorious "slush fund"
of the Committee to Re-elect the President might never have been
State
revealed. 3 2 Reporting provisions are at the heart of the "Model
' 3 3 and
Law
Campaign Contributions and Expenditures Reporting
34
the "Model State Statute: Politics, Elections and Public Office."
To increase the effectiveness of their disclosure laws, some states
have provisions to centralize receipt and disbursement of money. 3 A
candidate may be limited to one or two treasurers or committees. "
All contributions and expenditures may be required to be made by
the campaign treasurer.' 6
Items included in the reports should be detailed enough to give
voters the desired information but not so detailed as to unreasonably
inconvenience the candidate or treasurer. Federal law requires that
26. 519 F.2d 821 (1975).
27. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified in sections of 2, 18, 47 U.S.C.).
28. Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1975) (codified in sections of 2, 5, 18, 26, 47
U.S.C.).
29. The Court in Buckley v. Valeo expedited its proceedings so that an appeal could be
taken to the U.S. Supreme Court during the present term. 519 F.2d at 834-5. One of the
plaintiffs in the case anticipates that oral arguments will be heard by the Supreme Court by
the end of November. Speech by Eugene McCarthy, University of New Mexico School of
Law, Sept. 28, 1975.
30. 32 Cong. Q. 2360 (1974). The four states without disclosure laws at that time were
Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana and North Dakota.
31. C. Vernstein and B. Woodward, All the President's Men 55 (1974).
32. N.Y. Times, March 1, 1973, at 1, col. 2.
33. National Municipal League, Model State Campaign Contributions and Expenditures
Reporting Law (4th draft 1961).
34. H. Alexander and J. Molloy, Model State Statute: Politics, Elections and Public
Office (1974). The statute was drafted under the auspices of the Citizens' Research Foundation, an organization which has sponsored a number of studies on campaign finance. Their
thoughtful analysis should be considered by drafters of proposed legislation.
35. Id. at § 304(c); Barnhill, supra note 13; National Municipal League, supra note 33, at
§ 3; Rodgers, supra note 13.
36. National Municipal League, supra note 33, at § 4.
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reports of contributions include the name, address, occupation and
total sum contributed by each contributor of more than $100. 3 7
Alexander and Molloy's model bill requires name, home and business
address, occupation and social security number for each contributor
of $100 or more.3 8 New Mexico's present law requires "each sum,"
no matter what its size, received by a political committee to be
reported with the date and the name but not the occupation of the
donor.3 9

Commentators have questioned the constitutionality of forcing a
contributor to reveal his or her identity. 40 They note the possible
"chilling effect" on an individual's right of political expression
which
might result from fear of retaliation for contributing to an unpopular
cause. The case most frequently cited to support this argument is
NAACP v. Alabama,4 1 in which the Supreme Court held that Alabama could not require the NAACP to provide a list of its members
because members' fears of retaliation would inhibit the exercise of
their First Amendment rights. One author considers NAACP
inapposite because there was in Alabama at that time a "genuinely
threatening atmosphere" which justified the members' fears, an
atmosphere which is not present in the context of political contributions. Also, Alabama's interest in having the membership list of
thyNAACP was less substantial than the public's interest in knowing
the names of contributors to political campaigns. 4 2 Nonetheless,
requirements that the identity of contributors be disclosed run afoul
of what has been described as a "right to anonymity," which protects supporters of unpopular causes from fear of retaliation.4 3
The disclosure requirements of FECA have been challenged twice
in federal courts on the grounds that the required disclosure chills
the exercise of First Amendment rights. Both courts declined to
decide the question absent concrete evidence of retaliation. The
37. 2 U.S.C. § 434(b) (Supp. IV 1974).
38. H. Alexander and J. Molloy, supra, note 34, at § 305(1).
39. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 3-19-19 (Repl. 1970). The statute requires that the name of the
person from whom received be reported for each receipt. However, inspection of the financial statements filed in the county clerk's office in Bernalillo County reveals at least one
report of anonymous gifts totaling $200.
40. See Ferman, Congressional Controls on Campaign Financing:An Expansion or Contraction of the First Amendment? 22 Amer. U. L. Rev. 1 (1972); Redish, Campaign SpendingLawsandthe FirstAmendment, 46 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 900 (1971).
41. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
42. Rosenthal, Campaign Financing and the Constitution, 9 Harv. J. Legis. 359, 405
(1972).
43. See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960), Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479
(1960), see also Note, The ConstitutionalRight to Anonymity: Free Speech, Disclosure and
the Devil, 70 Yale L.J. 1084, 1111 (1961), Redish, supra note 40, at 924-932.
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relied on Laird v. Tatum,4" in which the
plaintiff claimed his First Amendment rights were chilled by Army
surveillance. In Laird the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff's
asserting his First Amendment rights by bringing suit indicated that
he was not inhibited by the Army action. He therefore lacked standing to challenge the surveillance program. In Buckley v. Valeo, the
court said,
It may well be that a party (or candidate) can demonstrate such
harassment to itself or to its supporters as to underpin a ruling that
disclosure in particular circumstances cannot consitutionally be
ourts sit to act in such
required. [CitingNAACP v. Alabamal ... 4[C]
6
cases when presented with a proper record.
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the question of the
constitutionality of FECA. However, in Burroughs & Cannon v.
United States, 4 7 it did declare constitutional FECA's predecessor,
the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925.48 The Act was not
challenged on First Amendment grounds, but rather on grounds that
disclosure requirements violated Article II, § 1 of the Constitution,
by usurping State power to determine the manner of appointment of
49
The Court held the exercise of Federal power
presidential electors.
valid because the Act regulated [multistate] political committees
beyond the power of the states to regulate adequately, noting,
The power of Congress to protect the election of President and
Vice President from corruption being clear, the choice of means to
that end presents a question primarily addressed to the judgment of
Congress. If it can be seen that the means adopted are really calculated to attain the end, the degree of their necessity, the extent to
which they conduce to the end, the closeness of the relationship
between the means adopted and the end to be attained, are matters

Pichler v. Jennings,"

Court

for congressional determination alone ...

Congress reached the

conclusion that public disclosure of political contributions, together
with the names of contributors and other details, would tend to
The verity of
prevent the corrupt use of money to affect 5elections.
0
denied.
be
this conclusion reasonably cannot
Burroughs has been interpreted as foreclosing inquiry as to whether
44. 347 F.Supp. 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
45. 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
46. 519 F.2d at 868.
47. 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
48. 43 Stat. 1053, 1070, Title III (1925) (repealed Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3, § 405
(1972)).
a
49. "Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct,
Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which
the State may be entitled in the Congress..." U.S. Const. art. II, § 1.
50. 290 U.S. at 547-48.
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there is a substantial connection between disclosure requirements
and a compelling governmental interest."' The court in Buckley v.
Valeo noted 2 that Burroughs was cited with approval in United
States v. Harriss," in which the Supreme Court upheld against a
First Amendment challenge the validity of a statute requiring disclosure of contributions for lobbying. The Supreme Court could rely
upon Burroughs and Harriss in holding the provisions of FECA constitutional. However, both cases were decided before First Amendment protection of a right of anonymity attained its present status.
Set against the individual's right of privacy, expression or association is the "public's right to know" which was held to be protected
by the First Amendment in New York Times v. Sullivan 4 and Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC " In Sullivan, the Supreme Court
required that a public official prove actual malice before recovering
damages for defamation. Otherwise, freedom of expression of
opinion regarding official actions and the public's right to access to
information and opinions about government figures might be inhibited. In Red Lion, the FCC's "fairness doctrine" was held constitutional in part, because, "It is the right of the public to receive
suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas
and experience .. ."56
A disclosure law may also be unconstitutionally overbroad for the
purpose of preventing corruption, since not everyone who makes
campaign contributions does so to obtain improper influence over a
candidate. In Talley v. California," the Supreme Court invalidated a
California statute requiring that all handbills bear the name of the
author. Although the governmental interest in preventing fraud was
found to be substantial, the Court held that the statute was overbroad because it inhibited the speech of persons who did not have a
fraudulent intent but who might fear expressing unpopular views if
their identity were disclosed." 8 A statute narrowly tailored to
achieving its purpose without unnecessarily impinging upon First
Amendment rights is required.
'

51. Pichler v. Jennings, 347 F.Supp. 1061, 1068 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
52. 519 F.2d at 864.
53. 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
54. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
55. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). This balancing of interests was suggested in Note, The Constitutionality of FinancialDisclosure Laws, 59 Cornell L. Rev. 345 (1974). It should be noted
that the right to know cases are cited in arguing against the constitutionality of limits on
campaign expenditures. See text accompanying note 81 infra.
56. 395 U.S. at 390.
57. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
58. See Tussman and tenBroek, The Equal Protectionof the Laws, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 341
(1949).
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For this reason, it is very important to choose a reasonable figure
as the minimum contribution which must be reported. It must be
low enough to include most of those contributors who might be
seeking undue influence and high enough to exclude most of those
contributors who are not. A high limit might also assure that those
contributors who are reported are wealthy enough to be immune
from retaliation.' 9
Most commentators agree that the $100 floor on contribution
reports in the federal law is too low to survive a challenge for overbreadth. 6 0 The provision did, however, survive in Buckley v. Valeo.
The court said:
Since the individual contribution limit is set at $1000, disclosure
limited to amounts in excess thereof would be tantamount to requiring those committing a crime to file reports of their offense. A
disclosure law serves the function of informing the electorate, and
must also function as an effective enforcement tool and loopholeclosing device. Unless the disclosure threshold is set substantially
below the contribution limit, patterns of giving (such as by all or
most of the members of an interest group) will pass unnoticed. The
legislature must have reasonable latitude as to where to draw the
line. 61
Regardless of the constitutionality of the $100' minimum in
federal elections, such a provision would almost certainly be proper
in a state legislator's or county official's campaign.
Limits on Contributions
Limitations on contributions are intended to prohibit large contributions which lead to undue influence and to minimize the effect
that one person may have on the electoral process. The argument
the
against the constitutionality of contribution limits is based 6on
2
The
expression.
political
premise that contributions are a form of
contribution itself has been termed the "cognitive" element of the
expression, and size of the contribution the "emotive" element. If
the emotive element of expression is restricted, it is argued, the
cognitive element will also be diluted because the two elements taken
6
together constitute speech. 1 Cases such as Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School Dist.," in which a student wore a
59.
60.
42, at
61.
62.
63.

Rosenthal, supra note 42, at 406.
Ferman, supra note 40, at 28; Redish, supra note 40, at 931; Rosenthal, supra note
407 n. 167.
519 F.2d at 865.
For a detailed analysis of this concept, see Ferman, supra note 40, at 8-12.
Ferman, supra note 40, at 23.

64. 393 U.S. 503 (1968).
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black armband to protest the war in Vietnam, and Cohen v. California,I6 in which a young man wore an obscene message concerning
the draft on the back of his jacket, are cited to show that the form of
the expression may be as important as the expression itself.6 6
In response an analogy is drawn between contributions and expenditures and the activity regulated in the cases of Saia v. New York 6 '
and Kovacs v. Cooper.6 Both cases dealt with the use of loudspeakers; their combined effect was to hold that while expression by
loudspeaker could not be prohibited altogether, it could be limited
to certain times and places. Professor Freund has said,
We are dealing here not so much with the right of personal expression or even association, but with dollars and decibels. And just as
the volume of sound may be limited by law, so the volume of dollars
6
may be limited, without violating the First Amendment. 9
A dissenting opinion in Buckley v. Valeo replied directly to this
argument:
Dollars are not merely the functional equivalent of decibels. By
regulating sound trucks through a noise ordinance, the Government
was not regulating the quantity of speech; Mr. Kovacs could broadcast as much and as often as he desired. That is not the case here.
Congress is attempting to limit quantity and frequency of speech, a
wholly different situation for which Kovacs offers no support. 70
Dollars may not be decibels, but they are certainly not pure
speech. Along with money, the donor is giving the candidate the
power to change that money into other items. Such a power can
cause results as noxious as any loudspeaker. Limitations on contributions do not prohibit a donor from making a political expression, nor
do they change the content of that expression. They merely reduce
the volume. The governmental interest in Saia and Kovacs was the
preservation of the public quiet. An interest in preserving the integrity of the electoral system should be even more compelling grounds
for upholding a regulation of expression.
The court in Buckley v. Valeo held the contribution limitation
constitutional by finding that it serves a compelling governmental
interest, reducing excessive influences and that any restriction of
expression is incidental.1 The constitutional problems, however,
65. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
66. Ferman, supra note 40, at 9.
67. 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
68. 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
69. Freund, Commentary, in A. Rosenthal, Federal Regulation of Campaign Finance:
Some Constitutional Questions 72 (1971).
70. 519 F.2d at 916-17 (Tamm, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
71. 519 F.2d at 832.
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were sufficient to persuade the drafters of the Citizens' Research
Foundation's model bill to omit limitations of any kind. 2
As with the floor on reporting of contributions, the amount of the
contribution limit will be important in deciding the question of overbreadth. A high limit will allow individuals more flexibility in their
choice of amount and will lessen the danger of restriction of political
expression. But the higher the limit, the less likely it is to achieve its
goal of equalizing influence. And the less likely it is to achieve its
goal, the less justifiable any restriction of expression would be.
As of August 1974, 17 states had passed laws setting limits on
contributions. 7" In 1974 Congress enacted the FECAA, which limits
an individual's contributions to $1,000 per candidate per election
and an aggregate of $25,000. 7 4 State limitations range from $600 in
New Jersey to $150,000 in New York. 75 A common figure for states
with low population and little industry such as Alaska and Vermont
is $1,000. The limitations in the bills introduced in the last session of
the New Mexico Legislature ranged from $1,50076 to $3,00077 for
statewide offices and from $25 071 to $1,00071 for other offices.
One thousand dollars for statewide offices and $500 for other offices
seem equitable, but the best figures would probably be found
through a careful study of such factors as per capita income and past
patterns of contributions.
Limits on Expenditures
The purpose of limiting expenditures is to stem rapidly increasing
campaign costs and to give the opportunity of running for office to
persons lacking substantial personal fortunes or party backing. In this
regard it should be noted that the 1972 Congressional race for New
Mexico's First District, neither a highly populous nor an unusually
wealthy area, was the thirteenth most expensive Congressional campaign in the country."0
There are several theories which support arguments against the
constitutionality of expenditure limitations. First, if a candidate's
ability to spend is limited, his or her ability to communicate all the
issues to all of the people is limited as a result, and the public's right,
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

H. Alexander and J. Molloy, supra note 34, at 7.
32 Cong. Q. 2362-5 (1974) (Table of State provisions).
18 U.S.C. § 608(b) (Supp. III 1973).
Supra note 73.
H.B. 102 (N.M.), 32nd Leg., 1st Sess. § 6A(2) (1975).
S.B. 263 (N.M.), 32nd Leg., 1st Sess. § 4B(1) (1975).
Id.
S.B. 331 (N.M.), 32nd Leg., 1st Sess. § 9A(2) (1975).
Common Cause, Campaign Finance Monitoring Project (1973).
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recognized in New York Times v. Sullivan,8 to be fully informed on
all issues having to do with government may be affected. It has been
suggested that present campaign advertising does not inform people
of the issues and that limiting the expenditures might force candidates to rely more on informative programs than on 60-second
"spots.""2 Although many contemporary political advertisements
communicate little, it does not follow that less money will result in
more information. And if the government rationale is that less
money will promote more meaningful political information, the
government is deciding what is worthwhile political expression,
which may amount to influencing the content of the expression.
It is also argued that the fear that big money will buy elections is
unfounded, since an election is influenced by many factors, of which
money may be among the leas important. The restriction on political
expression is therefore not balanced by sufficient benefit to the
electorate.' 3 The governmental interest in promoting a wider range
of candidates may even be injured by expenditure limitations since a
challenger may need a great deal of money to unseat an incumbent
who has all the advantages of franking privileges, newsworthiness and
party backing.8"
On the other hand, it can be argued that, like limitations on contributions, limiting expenditures can be justified by a substantial
governmental interest in allowing wider participation in the electoral
process. It neither flatly prohibits speech nor changes the content of
speech and may therefore be sustained against a First Amendment
challenge.
Finally, some statutes require that a candidate and his or her
treasurer have veto power over expenditures made by other persons
on the candidate's behalf.8" As the candidate approaches the ceiling
on expenses, certain people will be absolutely barred from expressing
their political beliefs either by donation or by expenditures on behalf
of the candidate. This will also allow the candidate to veto expenditures by persons or groups whose support he or she does not want to
publicize.
81. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See also, Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C 395 U.S. 367
(1969) and discussion of both cases in text accompanying notes 54-56, supra.
82. Note, supra note 55, at 361.
83. See the discussion on this point in Deras v. Myers, 535 P.2d at 546-8.
84. "Incumbents and those pursuing established policies ... get less for each dollar than
those seeking to challenge the status quo. .. . I am afraid that a limitation on the use of
money in campaigns would be a way of institutionalizing a political cartel in this country."
Winter, Commentary, in A. Rosenthal, Federal Regulation of Campaign Finance: Some
Constitutional Questions 76 (1971).
85. Ore. Rev. Stat. § 260.154 (Supp. 1973); S.D. Comp. L. § 12-25-7 (1975 Rev.); Vt.
Stat. Ann. tit. 17, § 2055 (Supp. 1975); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22.1-401 (Supp. 1975).
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In Bare v. Gorton, the Court found Washington's statute limiting
expenditures vague, but said that even were it not, the absolute
prohibition on political expression after the8 expenditure limit was
6
reached was a violation of freedom of speech.
The Oregon Supreme. Court, in declaring Oregon's expenditure
limitation statute unconstitutional in Deras v. Myers, found the first
two arguments persuasive, but based its holding on the third argument because the parties agreed that the statute limiting expenditures and the statute giving a veto over expenditures to the candidate
were so intertwined that they had to stand or fall together.' 7 The
Court reasoned that the veto power created an absolute prohibition
on the political expression of some people. Such a prohibition could
not stand unless necessary to achieve a compelling state interest.
Even a compelling state interest could not save the statute if less
restrictive alternatives existed to achieve the same ends. The alterna88
tive the Court suggested is public subsidy of campaign expenses.
There are several problems with the Oregon decision. First, the
Court. decided the case under the Oregon constitution and declared
itself not bound by United States Supreme Court First Amendment
The Court's decision is susceptible neither to use as
decisions. 8
precedent in other states nor to United States Supreme Court reversal.
Second, the "less restrictive alternative" the Court suggests, public
9
subsidy, has its own substantial constitutional problems. 0
Third, Congress, in the FECAA, provided that political supporters
could make donations or independent expenditures even after the
candidate's expenditure limit had been reached. The candidate may
receive a limitless number of contributions and may use money in
excess of the expenditure limitation for any legitimate purpose, as
9
long as its use is reported to the Election Commission. 1 This provision was cited by the court in Buckley v. Valeo in holding constitu92
Furthermore, suptional the FECAA expenditure limitations.
to a clearly
"relative
porters may make independent expenditures
9
identified candidate" up to $1,000. ' This amount is in addition to
the $1,000 limitation on donations and is not included in the candi86. 526 P.2d at 382.
,535 P.2d at 543.
Ore. at
87.
,535 P.2d at 549.
88. Id. at
89. The Court says: "The cases relied on by defendant were tested under the federal
constitution which ... is not controlling where this court is of the opinion that our constitution should provide a larger measure of protection t6 the citizen." 535 P.2d at 549.
90. See text accompanying notes 96-102 infra.
91. 2 U.S.C.A. § 439a (Supp. IV 1974).
92. 519 F.2d at 860.
93. 18 U.S.C. § 608(e) (Supp. IV 1974).

November 1975]

CAMPAIGN REFORM

date's expenditures. The Report of the Senate Rules and Administration Committee said of this provision:
Limiting the amount of independent expenditure someone may
make in support of a candidate, but not counting such amounts for
purposes of the overall spending limit of the candidate, is the best
compromise of competing interests in free speech and effective
campaign regulation.
It controls undue influence by a group or individual. Yet it avoids
the dilemma of either giving candidates a veto over such independent
expression or subjecting the candidate to the independent decisions
of his supporters, even if he prefers using his permitted expenditure
in other ways.
Thus, the bill preserves to everyone some right of political expression, which they can undertake regardless of whether the candidate
has already used up his permitted expenditures and regardless of
whether the expression they wish
to make on the candidate's behalf
94
"fits in" with his campaign plan.
The two FECAA provisions seem an adequate response to the
criticisms expressed in Bare v. Gorton and Deras v. Myers. Similar
provisions in a state campaign reform law might well allow the law to
survive a constitutional challenge.
Thirty-two states and the federal government have enacted
statutes limiting total campaign expenditures. 9 Although there are
several different ways to compute the limitation, the most logical
seems to be to allow a certain amount for each registered voter in the
candidate's district. This method has a rational relationship to the
campaign process in that a candidate in a more populous district has
more people to reach and so needs more leaflets, more workers, and
more media space. The amount per voter should depend on the
media facilities available, the geographic size of the district, the availability of transportation and favored campaign methods.
Public Subsidies
Public financing of campaigns, either totally or by matching funds,
through tax check-offs has been considered a more desirable means
of equalizing the opportunity to run for office than are limitations
on expenditures.9 6 As a less restrictive alternative, however, it leaves
something to be desired. If the subsidy is divided between the two
major parties, it discriminates absolutely against minority parties.
94. S. Rep. No. 93-689, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. (1974).
95. 32 Cong. Q., supra note 73.
96. Ferman, supra note 40; Nicholson, Campaign Financing and Equal Protection, 26
Stan. L. Rev. 815 (1974); Comment, Loophole Legislation-StateCampaign Finance Laws,
115 U.Pa. L. Rev. 983 (1967).
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And if it is to be divided among all parties, how does one decide
which is a real party and which a sham? The Supreme Court said
recently, in a case where an indigent was not allowed to run for
office because he would not pay the filing fee,
This legitimate state interest [in limiting ballots to serious candidates with some prospects of public support], however, must be
achieved by a means that does not unfairly or unnecessarily burden
either a minority party's or an individual candidate's equally important interest in the continued availability of political opportunity. The interests involved are not merely those of parties or
individual candidates; the voters can assert their preferences only,
through candidates or parties or both and it is this broad interest
that must be weighed in the balance. 9 7
The new federal law distributes money to minority parties on the
basis of votes in past elections. 9 8 Such a system obviously perpetuates existing party structures. Furthermore, a defunct party could
receive funds on the strength of an election four years before while a
new, but growing party would receive no financing.
In Buckley v. Valeo, the court said of public financing provisions,
We do not find them, on their face, to be invidiously discriminatory.
At the same time, we recognize the necessity for all concerned to
maintain a careful scrutiny as the provisions are implemented. 9 9
We recognize that under this scheme pre-election funding will
depend on figures almost four years old. But other devices which
might have been chosen to1 make the figures more current have their
own potential deficiencies. 00
A state law, of course, can base its distribution of funds on electoral
results every two years or oftener. The viability of third parties and
independents will be easier to estimate on the state level. These
factors should make the threat of discrimination against minority
parties, at least as far as government financing is concerned, more
remote.
The most equitable system is probably to allow the taxpayer to
designate the party to which the contribution will go. There is still a
problem with funds for which taxpayers did not designate a party.
However, a division in proportion to the amount that each party has
already received might be considered. One bill introduced in the last
session of the New Mexico Legislature provides for a taxpayer check97. Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974).
98. 26 U.S.C. § 9004(a) (Supp. III 1973).
99. 519 F.2d at 880.
100. 519 F.2d at 882.
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off of one dollar to a designated political party.' 01 Of course, such a
scheme discriminates against those too poor to pay taxes.' 02
Other suggestions include giving vouchers to people which can be
donated by them to the candidates of their choice and exchanged for
government campaign assets, making available to the candidates free
or less expensive access to the media' 03 and reasonable franking
privileges, and tax incentives to encourage a large number of small
contributors.
Enforcement
Essential to the effectiveness of any campaign reform law is that
the responsibility for enforcement be taken out of the office of an
elected official and put into a nonpartisan or at least a bipartisan
commission with extensive powers and a generous budget.
Plans of varying degrees of elaborateness have been proposed to
ensure impartiality of the enforcing agency. In Massachusetts the
state chairpersons of each political party, the state secretary, and the
dean of a Massachusetts law school appointed by the Governor act as
a commission to choose by unanimous vote a Director of Campaign
and Political Finance.' 4 The federal Election Commission has six
voting members, two of whom are appointed by the Senate, two by
the House and two by the President. And each body must appoint
two members not affiliated with the same political party.' o s On the
other hand, the Citizens' Research Foundation's model statute establishes a commission of five members, appointed by the Governor
with the advice and consent of the state Senate. No more than three
members of the Commission may be associated with the same political party, and none may hold elective or party office.' 06 A bill
introduced in the last session of the New Mexico Legislature would
have set up a State Ethics Authority, consisting of three members
appointed by the Governor and approved by the Senate. No member
could be of the same political party as any other member.' 07
Penalties should be heavy enough to deter offenses. Denying a
winning candidate his or her office should be effective if enforced.
101. S.B. 36, 32nd Leg., 1st Sess. (1975).
102. Nicholson, supra note 96, at 851-52.
103. But see Gore Newspapers Company v. Shevin, 397 F.Supp. 1253 (S.D.Fla. 1975), in
which a Florida statute, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 106.16 (1975), requiring newspapers to charge
political candidates the lowest local advertising rate was declared unconstitutional on First
Amendment grounds.
104. Barnhill, supra note 13, at 238-39.
105. 2 U.S.C. § 437c (Supp. 1975).
106. H. Alexander and J. Molloy, supra note 34, § 201.
107. S.B. 339, 32nd Leg., 1st Sess. § IA (1975).
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Some states have a similar provision for losing candidates in that they
cannot hold elective, appointive or party office for a period related
to the gravity of the offense.' 08
Fines in the amount of, or a multiple of, an illegal contribution or
expenditure seem an equitable punishment.'9 As for other
offenses, the penalty will vary with the gravity of the offense. But
attempted subversion of the political process should be punished
more severely than a traffic violation.
CONCLUSION

The heart of any campaign reform bill is reporting of contributions and expenditures. Reporting provisions also stand in the least
danger of being unconstitutional. Drafters should, however, keep in
mind the right of anonymity and the possibility of overbreadth and
should provide a fairly high minimum on the contributions that have
to be reported.
Although some legal scholars find limitations on contributions
unconstitutional, no court has done so. The causal relationship
between large contributions and undue influence is clearcut and can
be justified as a regulation, not a prohibition, of political expression.
The primary danger of overbreadth may be avoided by judicious
selection of the maximum contribution.
The greatest problems are created by limitations on the total
expenditures of candidates. Incorporation of provisions similar to
those in the FECAA 1 1 0 protect a supporter's right to political
expression, but the limitation on expenditures by the candidate
108. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-905 (1973); Md. Ann. Code art. 33, § 26-16 (Repl. 1971).
109. Tex. Election Code art. 14.05 (Supp. 1974) provides:
(a) Any candidate, campaign manager, assistant campaign manager, or
other person, who makes an unlawful campaign contribution or expenditure in
support of a candidate shall be civilly liable to each opposing candidate whose
name shall appear on the ballot in the next election after such contribution or
expenditure is made for double the amount or value of such unlawful campaign contribution or expenditure and reasonable attorneys fees for collecting
same.
(b) Any candidate, campaign manager, assistant campaign manager, or
other person, who makes an unlawful campaign contribution or expenditure
not expressly supporting any candidate but opposing a particular candidate or
candidates shall be civilly liable to each of such opposed candidates for double
the amount or value of such unlawful campaign contribution or expenditure
and reasonable attorneys fees for collecting same.
(c) Any candidate, campaign manager, assistant campaign manager, or
other person, who makes an unlawful campaign contribution or expenditure
shall, in addition to any other penalties, be civilly liable to the State of Texas
for an amount equal to triple the amount or value of such unlawful campaign
contribution or expenditure.
110. See text accompanying notes 91-94, supra.
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affects not only the candidate's freedom of expression, but the public's right to know. Added to this is the possibility that expenditure
limitations will obstruct wider political participation rather than aid
it. Drafters might be justified in relying on other methods to fulfill
the goals of campaign reform.
Public subsidy also raises serious problems, but is not hampered by
the same doubt of its effectiveness as expenditure limitations. A
good faith effort to match the distribution of funds to the wishes of
the public should render a subsidy provision constitutional.
The further away from Watergate the country gets, the less
momentum the legislature will have to pass a campaign reform law.
Legislators have claimed in the past that New Mexico does not need
campaign reform because political scandals don't happen here. But,
as the court in Buckley v. Valeo pointed out, it is as important to
prevent the appearance of undue influence as to prevent the influence itself "in order to avoid the corrosion of public confidence that
is indispensable to democratic survival."' 1 1 A bill, and a strong bill,
should be introduced and enacted in 1976.
ELIZABETH CUNNINGHAM
This term the United States Supreme Court issued an opinion in
Buckley v. Valeo, 44 U.S.L.W. 4127 (U.S. Jan. 30, 1976), reviewing
the FECA. The Court held the reporting provisions, the limitations
on contributions to candidates and the provisions for public financing constitutional. The limitations on total expenditures by a candidate and on personal resources a candidate could use were held
unconstitutional. The Court also struck down the section which
limited independent expenditures directly related to a candidate's
campaign on the grounds that such expenditures did not help
campaigns enough to create undue influence and that such limitations were too great a burden on First Amendment rights.
State Senators Tom Rutherford and Willie Chavez introduced a
campaign reform bill into the Second Session of the 32nd New
Mexico Legislature which was substantially the same as the bill
recommended by the Election Study Review Committee. The bill
contained only reporting provisions, but closed many of the loopholes in the present law and was, as the Committee said in their
Report, a first step towards campaign reform. At press time, the fate
of the bill was undecided.

111. 519 F.2d at 841.

